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Statement of General Bonesteel on proposed action in Endo case
read by Colonel Watson WDC to Captain Fisher Sept 20
The basic justification for our proposed action in the Endo case 
is that it would be in accord with the facts as now personally known 
to the Commanding General; namely, that there is nothing in her record 
which warrants the continuance of her exclusion. Such action would 
be directly in line with the action taken in the Shiramizu case and 
in a number of other cases, and with the same justification. The fact 
that this action may or may not moot the Endo case is incidental. If it 
would not moot the Endo case, that is, if the issue there does not 
include the legality of the exclusion of Japanese and detention as an 
incident thereof, then it is not clear why such action is opposed by 
the Department of Justice.
By Proclamation No. 8, dated June 27, 1942, the Commanding General, 
Western Defense Command, provided in part that persons of Japanese 
ancestry residing within the bounds of any established War Relocation 
project area established in the command are required to remain within 
such bounds at all times, unless a "written authorization is granted 
for departure executed by or pursuant to the express authority of this 
Headquarters By letter dated 11 August 1942 to the Director, War 
Relocation Authority, the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, 
"pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4, Public Proclamation
No. 8 of the Commanding General, dated June 27, 1942, and subject to
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the limitations in paragraph 2 hereof," delegated authority to the 
Director, War Relocation Authority, and to persons designated in 
writing “by him to grant written authorization to persons to leave and 
to enter War Relocation project areas.
It may he noted that paragraph 2 of said letter provided that 
certain jurisdiction was retained, in particular that part pertaining 
to release of persons of Japanese ancestry from any relocation center 
or project area for return to Military Area No. I or the California 
portion of Military Area No. II.
This delegation of authority does not and cannot deprive the 
Commanding General, who is charged with the authority and responsi­
bility for the exclusion, of the duty of controlling such exclusion 
and determining when it is no longer required by the military situation, 
and jurisdiction for such purpose was expressly reserved by him as 
above noted. The performance of that duty in this case should not 
in any way impinge upon nor impair the functions of WRA. Nor does it 
appear in fact that it had any such effect in the Shiramizu case.
The Commanding General would be in an untenable position if he should 
undertake to subordinate the foregoing considerations and the proposed 
action to the program of the War Relocation Authority.
furthermore, we are unable to see how the contemplated action 
could affect the Korematsu case in the Supreme Court. Even if in 
some way not apparent, the granting of exemption to Miss Endo could 
be used adversely in the Korematsu case, nevertheless this chance
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should be taken in view of the more compelling need for the Commanding 
General to properly discharge his responsibilities. The Xorematsu 
case involves a conviction for a criminal offense and puts in issue 
the validity of exclusion at the time the violation of the exclusion 
order was committed more than 2 years ago. The Undo case involves 
the legality of the continued detention up to the present of the 
petitioner in a War Relocation center as an incident of the exclusion . 
and evacuation program.
It is not believed that any court would object to a change in 
the status quo of the individual while the suit is pending, as here 
proposed, if it is made clear to the court that the change is made in 
the discharge of the Commanding General's duty and responsibilities 
with respect to exclusion and his determination if and when military 
necessity no longer requires its exercise with respect to this 
individual and others in a similar category. The court would not re­
quire the maintenance of the status quo for a period of two years, 
that is, the continued exclusion of the petitioner pending the 
final determination of the suit, if considerations of military 
necessity and the exercise of powers under Executive Order No. 9066 
no longer warranted the maintenance of the status quo. The Supreme 
Court itself recognized in the Hirabayashi case that restrictive 
measures under said Executive Order were only temporary and subject 
to being removed when the occasion warrants.
